After approximately five months since the exodus of around 140,000 Armenians from the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh (comprising 20,000 Armenians and approximately 120,000 Karabakhis), which occurred following the Third Karabakh War on September 19, 2023, the issue can be critically evaluated from a legal standpoint.

The departure of Armenians from Karabakh (Artsakh) amidst the atmosphere of terror ensuing from the nine-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the policy of starving the civilian population in Karabakh, the Third Karabakh War, and the deadly explosion 1  at the gas station on the Khankandi – Asgaran road, whose fuel was transported from the Republic of Azerbaijan, signifies developments fueled by thirty years of systematic hatred policy by the Baku government against all minorities in the country. Therefore, forcing the Armenians to escape from Karabakh exemplifies “forced displacement” aimed at “ethnic cleansing” through intimidation, inciting hatred, and perpetrating murder and rape, constituting a crime against humanity and genocide during peacetime according to international law principles. Furthermore, it also constitutes a war crime according to the Rome Statute adopted in 2002 by the International Criminal Court

Contrary to the allegations of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Armenians of Karabakh, who have inhabited this region since ancient times as noted by the renowned Greek historian Strabo and were considered part of “Caucasian Armenia” during the early Islamic period, are recognized as indigenous inhabitants despite historical displacements in the Caucasus. This fact has been documented in historical Islamic texts dating back approximately a thousand years. Consequently, under international law, the Armenians of Karabakh are acknowledged as the “indigenous people” of the region, not merely a minority.

From a legal standpoint, indigenous peoples possess attributes such as “ancient and temporal precedence of settlement,” “historical establishment and territory,” and “continuity with a specific land.” Unlike the international rights of minorities, the “international rights of indigenous peoples,” encompassing two conventions and the “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” adopted in 2007, recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to “autonomy,” “self-government,” and “land rights.” Moreover, throughout the history of the Caucasus, Karabakh has experienced various forms of local autonomy and self-governance, from historical periods like the Sisgan (Sionic) era to the Safavid period, functioning as a khanate or province.

Despite the Baku government’s propaganda machine’s efforts to absolve itself of the crimes of “forced displacement” and “ethnic cleansing,” whether by recalling the illegal Armenian separatist actions in 1992-94 or by denying the forced displacement of Armenians from Karabakh, the material and spiritual elements of the crime of “ethnic cleansing” of Karabakh Armenians by the Baku government, carried out with specific intent, are evident. From the perspective of “international human and humanitarian law,” the crimes and violent actions of Armenian separatists during the first Karabakh War cannot justify legitimizing the current policy of ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide by the Baku government. Both approaches are illegal, punishable, and condemned under criminal law.

Following the failure of the plan to “limitedly and symbolically settle Armenians” in a corner of Khankandi (Stepanakert), Baku is attempting to deny the reality of ethnic cleansing in Karabakh. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s repeated retreats and inaction in pursuing the rights of Karabakh Armenians further embolden Baku in this regard. Amidst recent developments in Karabakh, particularly the “forced displacement of Armenians,” violation of their property rights, and desecration of their historical and religious monuments, Armenia has lodged a complaint against Azerbaijan with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The court’s verdict condemning Baku and, more importantly, the demand for the safe return of Armenians, is foreseeable.

The ethnic cleansing perpetrated in Karabakh has been accompanied by approximately 500 cases of rape, torture, enforced disappearance, and murder. If documented by the Pashinyan government, this could further strengthen the legal case against Baku and implicate the Tel Aviv and Ankara governments. The ethnic cleansing perpetrated in Karabakh has been accompanied by approximately 500 cases of rape, torture, enforced disappearance, and murder. If documented by the Pashinyan government, this could further strengthen the legal case against Baku and implicate the Tel Aviv and Ankara governments. Considering Yerevan’s acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), this issue could be raised in that court, allowing the prosecution of Baku, Turkish, and Israeli officials and commanders involved in war crimes and genocide.

The expulsion of Armenians from Karabakh not only violates the right to property as stipulated in the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (1966) but also impacts Yerevan’s previous complaints against Baku in the International Court of Justice, based on the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1948).

Accredited reports indicate the beginning of the destruction and alteration of the cultural, religious, and historical heritage of native Armenians in Karabakh, violating the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict,

as well as UNESCO statutes and resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly aimed at safeguarding cultural and historical works during conflicts. Hence, there is a pressing need for a UN and UNESCO delegation to visit Karabakh, as emphasized in a robust resolution by the European Parliament against the Baku government. This demand is echoed by the public and elites in Iran, as Baku seeks to systematically erase Iran’s civilizational, cultural, historical, and religious works in Karabakh. The manipulation of Shushi Mosque’s works by Baku serves as evidence and an instance of “cultural genocide.”

By gauging the passive approach of the Pashinyan government, Baku aims to avert the forced deportation of Armenians from Karabakh evolving into a legal dispute with Yerevan, given the potential legal liability of the Aliyev family. Baku is well aware of how the legal ramifications of the 1915 Armenian massacre by the Ottomans persist despite Erdogan’s acknowledgment of “historical pain” in April 2014 and offering condolences a hundred years later.

Similarly, Ilham Aliyev, while reiterating Ankara’s excessive demands against Yerevan, emphasizes the need to refrain from the plan to repatriate “Armenians to Karabakh and ensure their rights and safety” in the upcoming peace treaty with Yerevan. He asserts that the discussion on the return of Azeris to Armenia, known as “Yer Azha,” should be considered. However, from a legal perspective, the return of Yer Azha to Armenia could be argued against the “return of Armenians expelled from Baku, Sumgait, Ganja, Shamakhi, and Nakhchivan,” not against the return of Armenians to Karabakh. This is because Karabakh has historically held a somewhat unique legal position, and during the 26 years of Karabakh peace negotiations (1994 to 2020), Azerbaijani authorities (Haydar Aliyev and Ilham Aliyev) explicitly committed to granting high-level autonomy to Karabakh to ensure the rights and security of ethnic Armenians. This commitment is reflected in the 1996 summit statement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Lisbon and the documents related to the negotiation processes known as Madrid, Astana, Prague, and Key West.

Although the miscalculations and repeated negligence of Pashinyan’s pro-Western government, which is seen as aligned with Aliyev, have given hope to Baku and Ankara to obtain more concessions from Yerevan and reject the return of Armenians to Karabakh, such fundamental developments do not fade with time and are considered a form of “sowing crisis” for the future. Leaving the issue unresolved in this manner can naturally create focal points and other excuses for insecurity and crisis in the Caucasus region and pave the way for exploitation by major powers in the future. Therefore, the permanent solution to the issue is the safe and unconditional return of the native Armenians of Karabakh to their homes and villages. This is an issue that many countries, including European countries as well as Iran, have a common stance on.

With an understanding of the historical situation in the Caucasus, Iran, more than any other country, considers ensuring the security and rights of the Armenians of Karabakh, including their return to their homes and villages, as one of the foundations of sustainable peace. For this reason, Tehran has emphasized, in visionary guidelines from Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution in 2019, the importance of guaranteeing the security of the Armenians of Karabakh alongside the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. It is clear that ensuring the “security of indigenous peoples” cannot be achieved without a legal framework. From a legal perspective, there is no conflict between the presence of the native Armenians of Karabakh in the form of autonomy under the rule of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the territorial integrity of this country.

Comparing the legal status of Karabakh and its indigenous peoples for autonomy with the rights of other minorities, which is done to deny these rights, is not considered logical, scientific, or legal arguments for three reasons: “the special historical conditions of Karabakh before and during the Soviet period,” “the previous commitments of the Baku government in this regard in 26 years of peace negotiations,” and “the difference between the rights of minorities and the rights of indigenous peoples.” Such a comparison, which is non-legal and more politically motivated, is made to strengthen Baku’s position and to cover up the ethnicist approaches of the Aliyev dynasty in the last three decades, as well as to stabilize ethnic cleansing in this region.

Baku, acting as a Turkish protectorate and an agent of the London-Israeli front, is attempting to overcome the consequences of the “forcible transfer of Armenians from Karabakh” with the seriousness of the neo-Ottoman plan and to follow up on demographic changes in Karabakh. Considering various factors and processes after 2020, the regional and global movements of Zionism, the issue of settling Israelis in Karabakh is being pursued seriously by the Aliyev family. It is possible that this matter has become a kind of commitment for Ilham Aliyev during the 2020 war in response to the support of the Tel Aviv regime to Baku, similar to Heydar Aliyev’s commitment in 1999 to supply oil to the Israeli regime through the Baku-Tbilisi pipeline under any circumstances.

In fact, a neo-Ottoman-Israeli strategy based on the settlement of the Takfiri Brotherhood in the liberated lands outside Karabakh and the establishment of Zionism in Karabakh (instead of Armenians) is being followed. The failure of the “Second Israel” project in “Argentine Patagonia” and the attractions of the Caucasus and the Republic of Azerbaijan near Iran’s borders have put the idea of implementing the “Second Israel” in Karabakh in the spotlight, especially after the establishment of the Sochnut office (Jewish Agency for Israel) in Baku on the agenda of the Hebrew-Western-Neo-Ottoman front.

This comes as the issue of the safe return of the native Armenians of Karabakh to this region is not a challenge that Baku can easily tackle, despite being overshadowed by global developments, including events in the Caucasus, due to the international crimes of the Israeli regime in Gaza and the Pashinyan government’s unwillingness to seriously pursue this issue and even facilitate the non-return of Armenian refugees. Karabakh groups have emphasized the right to return. Armenian public opinion is also aware that the state structure and artificial identity in the Republic of Azerbaijan are fundamentally based on racial hatred, and they know very well that ignoring the rights of the Armenians of Karabakh and sacrificing their rights makes the nationalist governments of Baku and Ankara more active in pursuing the partition plan of Armenia. Therefore, from their perspective, no government in Yerevan has the legitimacy and authority to waive this right.

Despite the disruption caused by some European countries such as Hungary, who benefit from overt and hidden oil bonuses from the Aliyev family, the European Parliament clearly states in paragraph 5 of its October 2023 resolution that Baku is fully responsible for the rights, security, and well-being of the people of Karabakh. It must be held accountable, and the President of Azerbaijan is urged to ensure “the right of return to the land,” Armenians’ property rights, the right to live with dignity and a distinct identity, and their full enjoyment of civil, cultural, social, and religious rights. The United Nations Charter and all the rules of international human and humanitarian law acknowledge and affirm this.

The reason for Europe’s position, excluding England due to Brexit, which, akin to its movements in 1918, still envisions the creation of NATO’s Turani Corridor (Fake Zangzor Corridor), is their understanding of the impact of the ethnic cleansing of Karabakh on strengthening Turkey’s neo-Ottoman strategies and the formation of the so-called Turkish world, which Europeans historically view negatively. They understand that the strengthening of Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism will create new security, political, and geopolitical challenges for parts of Europe.

The requirement for lasting peace and stability in the Caucasus, which Tehran consistently emphasizes and was also mentioned in the statement of the 3+3 format in Tehran in November 2023, is for Baku to abandon the policy of “blind obedience” to the plans of the London-Israeli axis, end the neo-Ottoman era, and not tie the future fate of its sovereignty to foreign scenarios. From this perspective, the solutions are clear: 1. Serious pursuit and a non-instrumental approach to creating the Aras Corridor, which would benefit Baku, Tehran, as well as Yerevan and the entire region. 2. Halting ethnocentric and hatred-based policies, returning Armenians to Karabakh, and guaranteeing their rights and security within the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 3. Ending the current state of relations between Baku and Tel Aviv, which exemplifies the surrender of sovereignty to Zionism.

By Dr. Ahmad Kazemi University Professor of International Law

To learn more about the concepts of “minorities” and “indigenous peoples,” refer to the book “The Concept of Minority in International Human Rights Documents” authored by Dr. Ahmad Kazemi.

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  1. On 25 September 2023, an explosion at a filling station in Berkadzor near Stepanakert, in the disputed region of Karabakh, resulted in the deaths of at least 220 people and 300 injuries.