Dr. Ahmad Kazemi, a university professor and senior researcher on Eurasian issues, explained the “Areas for Iran-Europe Cooperation in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War” in his speech at the international conference “South Caucasus Along Fault Lines; Regional and International Perspectives,” which was held in Yerevan with the participation of guests from the United States, European countries, China, Turkey, Georgia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The details of this speech are presented to the audience:

In the Name of God

Areas of Cooperation Between Iran and Europe in the South Caucasus After the Second Karabakh War

Greetings to all the professors present at the conference “The South Caucasus Along Fault Lines: Regional and International Perspectives.”[1] I would like to express my gratitude to the Turpanjian Institute of Social Sciences affiliated with the American University of Armenia (AUA) for organizing this conference. The title of my presentation is “Areas of Cooperation Between Iran and Europe in the South Caucasus After the Second Karabakh War.”

Following the Second Karabakh War in November 2020, the political equations in the Caucasus, which were largely based on the balance of power between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, underwent a significant shift. From the end of the First Karabakh War in 1994 until 2020, a certain balance of power had governed the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent attack by the Republic of Azerbaijan on the autonomous region of Karabakh in 2023, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Stepanakert/Khankendi and other cities in the region, introduced new conditions in the Caucasus. These developments have impacted all political, military, economic, energy, and transit domains in the region. The new circumstances in the Caucasus are not merely the result of the will of Azerbaijan and Armenia but stem from the intervention of certain regional and extra-regional actors. These actors, in exchange for assisting Baku in the 2020 and 2023 Karabakh wars, pursue broader geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural objectives in the region while securing special privileges from Baku.

An analysis of the conditions in the Caucasus and the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia since 2020 reveals that the greatest threats in this region arise from efforts by some countries to alter borders for geopolitical and ethnic purposes. This constitutes a blatant violation of these countries’ commitments under the United Nations Charter and peremptory norms of international law—a matter that represents one of Iran’s most serious concerns in the Caucasus.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was among the leading countries in the region and the world to recognize the independence of the three South Caucasus states: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. At the outset of their independence, crises such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjara, and Nagorno-Karabakh emerged. Iran, in line with the UN Charter and binding rules of international law, emphasized several legal principles that continue to form the core of Iran’s principled policy in the Caucasus today:

  • – Support for the territorial integrity of South Caucasus countries and the inviolability of official and international borders.
  • – Emphasis on the peaceful resolution of border and territorial disputes among regional countries based on principles of peaceful dispute settlement, as outlined in Article 33 of the UN Charter, including negotiation and mediation.

Iran is a country with a historical and civilizational presence in the South Caucasus. Consequently, the Iranian people’s perspective on the Caucasus is fundamentally national and transcends political inclinations. Throughout the region’s ancient history, Iran has played the role of a host in the South Caucasus, and safeguarding peace and stability in the face of invaders forms part of Iran’s historical legacy.

Tehran’s approach to developments in the South Caucasus, unlike that of some actors, is not rooted in ethnic biases or historical animosity. Similarly, unlike certain players, Iran does not adopt an exclusionary stance toward the South Caucasus. Based on this, Tehran takes pride in having advocated, nearly thirty years ahead of some regional countries, for the 3+3 cooperation model—emphasizing collaboration among the three South Caucasus countries and their three neighbours, alongside constructive engagement with powers outside the region, including Europe.

The shift in equations in the Caucasus following the Second Karabakh War has created new opportunities for cooperation between Iran and continental Europe. Over past centuries, there have been numerous instances of collaboration between Iran and Europe in various regions. In the Caucasus itself, Iran and France historically cooperated to counter the expansionism of the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia.

Dear attendees, I believe that the Caucasus today can serve as a platform for cooperation between Iran and continental Europe because there are shared interests, opportunities, and threats that provide a basis for interaction and collaboration. Perhaps this is why Iran, unlike Turkey and Russia, has not taken a negative stance over the past two years regarding the presence of European observer groups in Armenia. It appears that there is a degree of alignment between Iran and Europe on certain key issues in the Caucasus, which can be categorized into ten areas. These ten topics, which could serve as the foundation for Iran-Europe cooperation in the Caucasus in this new era, are as follows:

Topic 1: Countering Border Changes and Supporting the Territorial Integrity of Caucasus Countries

Iran and Europe share common interests in supporting the territorial integrity of Caucasus and Eurasian countries. It is evident that part of Baku’s current propaganda against France, using the pretext of the situation in New Caledonia, stems from Paris’s support for Armenia’s territorial integrity against the territorial ambitions of Baku and Ankara. Respect for the territorial integrity of states, as a fundamental principle of the UN Charter, has consistently been emphasized by Iran in relation to Caucasus issues. Iran’s stance on the necessity of respecting the territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan has remained unchanged over the past three decades. For instance, Iran emphasized Georgia’s territorial integrity during the Abkhazia and South Ossetia developments in 1993 and 2008, as well as Ukraine’s territorial integrity during the Ukraine conflict.

Topic 2: Countering Pan-Turanism, Neo-Ottomanism, and the Turanian Ethnic Corridor

Developments in the five years since the Second Karabakh War indicate that one of the goals of Turkey and Azerbaijan in that conflict was to establish an extraterritorial corridor between Nakhchivan and the main territory of Azerbaijan through southern Armenia. Circles in Baku and Ankara do not conceal that such a corridor is deemed necessary for creating a “Turkic world.” Turkey, under its neo-Ottoman policies, seeks to use Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism as tools for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The presence of terrorists from various Turkic ethnic groups—such as Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Turkmens—in recent developments in Syria demonstrates the extent to which Baku and Ankara’s Pan-Turkist policies pose a danger to the region. Europe is well aware of the risks posed by the revival of Ottomanism and Pan-Turkist policies. Thus, Iran and Europe share common interests in opposing the extraterritorial corridor that Baku falsely refers to as the “Zangezur Corridor.” Both acknowledge that the 2020 Moscow ceasefire agreement does not grant any rights to establish such a corridor, as the reopening of communication routes does not equate to an extraterritorial corridor that undermines the sovereignty of the host country.

Topic 3: Persian Gulf-Black Sea Transit Corridor and the Aras Corridor

India, currently the world’s fifth-largest economy, is the European Union’s largest trading partner in the region. Bilateral trade between the two in 2024 amounted to over €120 billion. With the conclusion of free trade agreements between India and some European countries, the prospects for trade growth are exponential, but this requires cost-effective and secure transit routes. The Persian Gulf-Black Sea transit corridor, connecting India to Europe via Iran’s Chabahar oceanic port, Armenia, Georgia, the Black Sea, and Bulgaria, is one of the key corridors linking India to the EU. Compared to the Suez Canal route, it is more cost-effective and time-efficient. From this perspective, Iran and Europe share interests in constructing the south-to-north highway in Armenia. Iran’s private sector has already invested $210 million in transit projects in southern Armenia, while the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has provided €236 million in loans for road and tunnel construction in Armenia. Strengthening the Persian Gulf-Black Sea corridor via Armenia also supports Armenia’s “Crossroads of Peace” initiative and the Aras Corridor. By signing the “Aras Corridor” memorandum with Baku in March 2022 and initiating its implementation, Tehran has proposed a logical, economical, and efficient solution for connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Iran’s Aghband border point—consistent with Tehran’s role over the past three decades in facilitating land connections between the two parts of Azerbaijan’s territory. As part of the broader “Iran Road” initiative, the Aras Corridor could not only resolve disputes between Baku and Yerevan and end Baku’s pretexts but also become a primary route for the “International Middle Corridor” from Central Asia to the Caucasus and the EU.

Topic 4: Property Rights and the Right of Return for Armenians to Karabakh

The Republic of Azerbaijan’s attack on Stepanakert, the center of Karabakh, in September 2023 led to the forced migration of over 120,000 indigenous Armenians from Karabakh to Armenia. This action has been condemned by the United Nations, various countries, and numerous legal experts as an instance of ethnic cleansing. During the Second Karabakh War, Iran emphasized the security of the Armenian minority at the highest levels, and today, Iranian circles continue to stress the right of return for Karabakh Armenians, the protection of their property rights, and the preservation of their historical and religious heritage. The European Parliament, in its resolution on October 4, 2023—passed with 491 votes in favor and only 9 against across 22 articles—highlighted that the complete ethnic cleansing of Karabakh Armenians constitutes a crime against humanity and a gross violation of human rights by Baku. The resolution also underscored the right of return for Armenians to Karabakh, respect for their cultural and religious rights, and the need for a UNESCO presence in the region. Like Europe, Iranian circles welcome the investigation of this ethnic cleansing at the International Criminal Court.

Topic 5: Combating Hate Speech Based on Historical Distortion

Ethnic hate speech rooted in historical distortions is a persistent issue that the Republic of Azerbaijan has grappled with since its independence. The systematic promotion of ethnic hatred in textbooks and educational institutions contradicts international norms. Baku has attempted to cover up this issue through “caviar diplomacy” in Europe, but actions such as honoring Ramil Safarov—an Azerbaijani officer who murdered Armenian officer Margaryan with an axe during a NATO training course in Budapest in January 2004—and the establishment of a war trophies museum in Baku in 2021 demonstrate the persistence of this approach. Iran and Armenia are primary targets of Baku’s hate propaganda. Iran and European institutions have repeatedly called for the removal of hate-inciting content from Azerbaijan’s textbooks. In this regard, while emphasizing the implementation of the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the provisional ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on this matter, it seems likely that both would welcome the ICJ’s forthcoming ruling.

Topic 6: Economy and Energy

While the instrumental use of economy and energy in the Caucasus may yield short-term results, politicizing economic and energy issues is detrimental not only to neighboring countries like Iran but also to Europe. It freezes potential, fosters competition instead of cooperation, and promotes exclusivity. There is ample evidence that Baku uses its energy leverage to counter human rights criticisms. The European Parliament’s critical stance in its 2023 resolution regarding Baku’s transfer of Gazprom’s Russian oil under the guise of Azerbaijani gas indicates that the notion of Europe benefiting from unilateral reliance on Baku’s oil and gas is misguided. Iran and Europe share common interests in reviving the Nabucco gas pipeline project.

Topic 7: Continuation of the Minsk Group Activity

The Minsk Group was established in 1992 under a UN initiative and delegated to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the height of the First Karabakh War. Eleven OSCE member states are part of the Minsk Group, but decision-making lies with its co-chairs: Russia, France, and the United States. Since September 2023, Baku has insisted on the dissolution of the Minsk Group, making it a key condition for peace with Armenia. Baku seeks to portray the Karabakh issue as regionally and internationally resolved by dismantling the group. It appears that Iran and Europe share the view that, legally, the Minsk Group’s dissolution should occur only after a peace agreement is signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Given Baku’s campaign of territorial claims, such as referring to Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan,” only such a legal document can ensure the resolution of fundamental disputes between the two countries.

Topic 8: Environmental Protection; Protecting the Caspian Sea environment from oil pollution

Protecting the Caspian Sea environment from oil pollution, as emphasized in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations (1972 and 1992), is a legal value upheld by the European Union. Dozens of environmental conventions have been adopted in Europe. Iran is one of the countries with the greatest environmental concerns regarding the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. As the only Caspian coastal state not extracting oil from the sea, Iran suffers the most from pollution caused by the oil activities of other coastal states. Under the “polluter pays” principle, escalating oil pollution in the Caspian could challenge the operations of some European oil companies in the region. Thus, Iran and Europe share interests in implementing the Tehran Convention on the Caspian Sea’s environmental protection, signed by the five Caspian littoral states in November 2003. Additionally, Iran holds a 10% stake in the second phase of Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II gas field and partners with major European companies like Total and Lukoil.

Topic 9: Rights of Minorities

Iran and Europe share broadly similar views on the need to respect the rights of ethnic, linguistic, national, and religious minorities in the Caucasus, including in Azerbaijan. The Advisory Committee of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has repeatedly, including in its 2017 report, emphasized Baku’s obligations to uphold the cultural, religious, and linguistic rights of minorities such as the Talysh and Lezgi—obligations Baku accepted when it ratified the convention in October 2000. As I elaborated in my book The Status of Minorities in the Republic of Azerbaijan from the Perspective of International Law , Iranian circles are sensitive to the situation of minorities in Azerbaijan for various reasons, including Iran’s historical presence in the Caucasus and the presence of Iranian-origin minorities like the Talysh, Tats, and Kurds.

Topic 10: Opposition to an Exclusionary Approach to the Caucasus

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, some countries entered the Caucasus with a 1+3 model, adopting an exclusionary approach that denied rights to other actors. For years, Russia followed this approach in the Caucasus. After the Second Karabakh War, Turkey has pursued a similar model. This has resulted in insistence on Russia-centric regional blocs like the Collective Security Treaty Organization or Turkey-centric ones like the Trabzon Pact. Iran and Europe share common interests in countering this exclusionary approach. Iran’s cooperation with the Eurasian Customs Union and its participation in the TRACECA project, supported by the EU, demonstrate Tehran’s support for multilateral cooperation in the region.

Dear Attendees,
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that at a time when some powers, driven by unilateral and short-term interests, seek to exacerbate fault lines of conflict in the Caucasus, the ten topics outlined above demonstrate that Iran and Europe—despite differences on some regional and international issues—enjoy opportunities, common ground, and even unprecedented potential for cooperation in the Caucasus.

I thank the professors attending this conference for their patience.

The End

[1] . The South Caucasus along Fault Lines: Regional and International Perspectives