Simultaneous with the intensification of competition among global and regional powers, which coincides with the accelerating collapse of the international legal-political order, the visit of J.D. Vance, Vice President of the United States, to Armenia and Azerbaijan indicates Washington’s hastening efforts to impose an American–Saxon order upon the Caucasus. Following the two-hour trip of George Bush to Georgia in May 2005 and the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Armenia in September 2022, Vance is the highest-ranking American official to travel to the South Caucasus in the past two decades; this underscores the great importance of this visit. The negotiations and agreements reached with Baku and Yerevan during Vance’s trip covered a wide range of political, military, energy, nuclear, transit, commercial, artificial intelligence, and security issues. Looking at these agreements and signed documents, such as the “Charter of Strategic Partnership between the Government of Azerbaijan and the Government of the United States,” the purpose of Vance’s visit to the Caucasus can be summarized in one key sentence: “a new phase of Washington’s comprehensive efforts to expel Iran and Russia from the Caucasus and to regulate the Caucasian order within the orbit of the United States.”

From this perspective, regarding the outcomes of Vance’s visit to the Caucasus, six explanatory points can be raised.

 First, the agreements reached by Vance with the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia are not merely the result of recent negotiations but rather the outcome of a process that the Anglo-Saxon front began in 2020 under the cover of the Second Karabakh War in the Caucasus. The political-security masterpiece of the United States and the United Kingdom in this regard was placing the leaders of both countries (Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan) on a trajectory aligned with American interests, even at the expense of their national interests. This has roots in the engineering of regional developments, particularly the process of guaranteeing hereditary rule in Azerbaijan and the 2018 color revolution in Armenia. For this reason, it was clear from 2020 that what was called the corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan was not a “Russian idea” but rather an American, NATO, Turanian, and Israeli corridor, whose dimensions are now revealed in the form of the Trump Route.

Second, the most important goal of the United States in Armenia is to weaken the infrastructure of Russian and Iranian presence in this country. In recent years, this has been more evident in the political sphere, the most important example being Armenia’s suspension of cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and its prioritization of cooperation with the European Union instead of the Eurasian Customs Union. Now, U.S. efforts are focused on weakening Russia’s presence in the Caucasus, especially in the military and energy domains. Thus, alongside the sale of American V-BAT reconnaissance drones to Armenia, and given the necessity of shutting down the Metsamor nuclear power plant in the near future, agreements have been made for the construction of small nuclear power plants by the United States in Armenia. In this process, the main U.S. plan is the realization of the Trump Route, through which Armenia’s oil, gas, fuel, and even electricity will become dependent on Azerbaijan and American companies, and consequently Armenia’s energy cooperation with Russia and Iran, especially in the fields of gas and electricity, will be completely severed in a gradual process.

Third, the agreement to sell military frigates by the United States to Azerbaijan during Vance’s trip is in line with Washington’s previous moves to militarize the Caspian Sea, which over the past three decades has been pursued through some joint naval exercises between Baku, the United States, and Israel in the Caspian. The militarization of the Caspian Sea by the United States and NATO, and the presence of American drones in this body of water, can create a new source of vulnerability for Russia and Iran. Moreover, the Caspian Sea plays a key role in transferring gas from Central Asian countries, especially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, to Azerbaijan and from there to Turkey and Europe. At present, legally, and due to the non-ratification of the Caspian Sea legal regime convention in Iran’s parliament—affected by environmental risks and the lack of fair share for Iran—pipeline construction across the Caspian seabed is not possible. Naturally, in the future outlook, Russia, under severe energy export sanctions, will not allow gas from the “near abroad” in Central Asia to be transferred to Europe before its eyes. Therefore, the United States seeks, through military presence in the Caspian, to reassure Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan of the continuity of energy transfer via maritime tankers.

Fourth, one of the most important issues raised during Vance’s visit to Baku was America’s appreciation of Azerbaijan’s participation in NATO’s so-called military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia, especially since Azerbaijan was one of the main logistical lines for the United States and ISAF to Afghanistan; Azerbaijani forces were the last group to leave Afghanistan alongside the Americans. Nevertheless, it seems that Vance’s appreciation of Baku’s role goes beyond these services. Azerbaijan is the only country in the region that has participated in all U.S. and NATO military interventions, whether under the guise of peacekeeping or counterterrorism. The latest aspect of this participation was Azerbaijan’s full support in the 12-day U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran, to the extent that American think tanks spoke of the emergence of a “Washington–Tel Aviv–Baku triangle.” Therefore, part of Vance’s appreciation indirectly relates to Baku’s anti-Iranian role and Aliyev’s guarantee to continue this role in the future.

Fifth, a set of agreements and negotiations during Vance’s trip to Azerbaijan and Armenia concerned the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.” Naturally, with the introduction of “unimpeded passage” for Azerbaijan in the Washington trilateral agreements of August 2025, the Trump Route is the same as the “fake Zangezur Corridor” or “NATO Turanian Corridor,” which primarily has political, security, geopolitical, and ethnic functions, followed by transit, energy, and commercial functions. However, the profits will not go to Azerbaijan and Armenia—Armenia will hold only 24 percent of the consortium for its section of the route. Until now, BP of the United Kingdom was the main beneficiary of Azerbaijan’s energy fields, but from now on ExxonMobil and American companies close to Trump will be the primary beneficiaries. This is the main reason for Trump’s direct involvement in the matter. From Trump’s perspective, in the process of eliminating Russia’s role in supplying Europe’s energy after the start of the Ukraine war, Europe’s gas must be supplied by U.S. LNG, and if not, the United States must share in the profits. Thus, BP and ExxonMobil are the biggest beneficiaries of Azerbaijan’s energy supply to 16 European countries.

Sixth, the statement by Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan, that Russia deliberately targeted Baku’s energy and diplomatic centers in Ukraine shortly after Vance’s visit is no coincidence. Through this, Aliyev seeks both to justify Baku’s rapid move toward the United States and NATO and to demonstrate his confidence in Washington’s support for Azerbaijan, which under Trump—through the repeal of Section 907 (the U.S. Congress resolution imposing financial and arms sanctions on Baku since 1992) and future arms contracts—will become evident. Yet the history of international relations and geopolitical geography shows that two small countries in a geopolitical region, neighboring or adjacent to three global and regional powers, cannot freely move within the orbit of their enemies. History bears witness that such political bridge-building sooner or later collapses, and only the manner of collapse differs across the history of international relations.

Dr. Ahmad Kazemi, Senior Eurasia Researcher