(With Trump’s Route, have the dangers of the fake Zangzor corridor and geopolitical changes been eliminated?)

On August 8, 2025, US President Donald Trump hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. During this meeting, a 7- article statement was signed between the leaders of the three countries, as well as a 17- article agreement between the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia; this issue has created a wave of analysis regarding the future of Baku-Yerevan relations and the fate of the fake Zangzor corridor.

Regarding the documents signed in the White House, ten points can be explained from a legal perspective:

First; Although, unlike the statement, the agreement is a binding document, but considering the circumstances and circumstances leading to the signing of the documents in the last five years, the legal analysis of the 17-article agreement of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia should be considered simultaneously with the examination of the 7-article statement. Because neither Baku nor Yerevan were willing to sign the 17-article agreement without the 7-article statement; also, the aforementioned provisions had been prepared a year ago, but the parties were unwilling to sign it; therefore, separating the analytical and thematic link of the agreement and the statement is wrong.

Second, the Republic of Azerbaijan, with the help of the Turkish, Hebrew and London axis, over the past five years, by using the means of threats and holding about fifty military exercises, normalizing the illusion of the fake Zangruz corridor and referring to Western Azerbaijan as the whole of Armenia, was not willing to sign an agreement, even at the level of foreign ministers, on the recognition of Armenia’s territorial integrity before obtaining the concession of the extraterritorial corridor; because this would mean waiving the extraterritorial corridor or creating an obstacle to it. However, in Articles 1 and 2 of the 17-article agreement, the foreign ministers of the two countries confirmed that the borders between the Soviet socialist republics had become the international borders of the respective independent countries, and emphasized that the parties recognize and respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence by refraining from any territorial claims, use of force or threat of use of force. Three points can be made in this regard:

  1. Iran’s assertive stance in confronting geopolitical changes at high levels, holding military exercises to protect red lines, and issuing overt and covert warnings to Baku and Ankara; despite the extensive efforts of the influence lobby in Iran, it has been effective in moderating Baku’s position. The Baku government failed to include the fake word Zangezur in a document with Armenia.
  2. Baku still hopes to achieve the goal of “unimpeded connectivity” with Nakhchivan and Türkiye under the Trump plan.
  3. Despite the reference to the Almaty Declaration of 1991, the non-binding tripartite declaration, due to Baku’s opposition, does not mention the Almaty Declaration of 1991 in the binding 17-point agreement; the Almaty Declaration was the cornerstone for identifying the borders of the former Soviet Union, based on the latest maps agreed during the Soviet period. The maps cited in this declaration are not to Baku’s liking. This issue, together with the fact that the determination of border delimitation is subject to the need to sign a new agreement based on Article 6 of the 17-point agreement and the establishment of border commissions, and the remaining ambiguity of the situation within the enclaves, has given Baku hope that it can continue to use this issue as a tool for pressure against Yerevan or, if the circumstances change, it can resume its claims in this way.

Third, although Article 3 of the Trilateral Statement in the White House as a supplement to Article 10 of the Agreement, regarding the importance of opening communication routes to ensure domestic, bilateral and international transportation between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction of the states, does not use the word “corridor”, the emphasis on unimpeded connectivity creates the same “corridor function” for the Republic of Azerbaijan. From the perspective of legal hermeneutics, “unimpeded connectivity” creates a broad interpretation at the disposal of Baku to oppose any security surveillance and customs control. In Article 3 of the Statement on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the term “Route” is used instead of the word “Road”, which can have a broader meaning based on railways, roads, energy lines and fiber optics. According to the Statement, it is stipulated that Armenia and the United States will sign a separate agreement on determining the framework of the Trump plan, and the details will be specified in it; Therefore, up to now, and based on the available documents, by transforming the “fake Zangzur corridor” into the “Trump route”, no fundamental and substantive change has been made in the nature of the geopolitical intrigue that is the creation of the corridor (unhindered connection of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan), and the NATO, Turanian, and Hebrew functions of this corridor continue in connection with the David Corridor, and only in the silence of the statement, the Armenian side has announced that its management will be in the hands of an American-Armenian consortium and mutually agreed third parties.

Fourth, according to Article 4 of the White House statement on the Trump Path to International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the Republic of Armenia will cooperate with the United States and “mutually agreed third parties” on its territory to determine the framework of this plan. In this regard, four points can be emphasized:

  1. Baku hopes to participate in this plan as a “third party” after Pashinyan de-escalates sensitivities in Armenia. Baku’s major energy concession to Washington, which was ceded during Aliyev’s visit and in the form of the signing of the energy contract between SOCAR and ExxonMobil, can be evaluated from this perspective.
  2. Russia has been severely weakened in the region due to repeated mistakes in the Caucasus after 2020. Although the agreements and results of the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska on August 15, 2025 have not been made public, the possibility that the Kremlin will trade its weakened position in the Caucasus with the United States in the Ukraine case and in the form of the idea of “peace in exchange for the cession of eastern Ukrainian territories” is not unlikely; An approach that could become the Kremlin’s last mistake in the Caucasus, because the White House hopes that in the framework of the Trump route plan, while expanding NATO to both sides of the Caspian, benefiting from the benefits of the new Middle Corridor route, and gaining greater control over China’s routes, and seeking a share in the benefits of transferring Caspian energy to Europe, it will be able to remove Central Asian energy and rare metals, as well as the mines of southern Armenia, especially the “molybdenum of the Qajaran,” from this route. From this perspective, the future focus of the Anglo-Saxon axis and their influence lobby in Iran will be on pressuring Tehran to ratify the Convention on the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, because without it, it will not be possible to build a pipeline through the seabed or any ambitious project such as an East-West railway line under the Caspian Sea bed.
  3. If the Pashinyan government, in order to contain the geopolitical excesses of Baku and Yerevan, sought to involve a third country in the issue, other than Russia, it could have offered Iran the role of “monitoring and controlling” the route, especially to remove accusations of moving along the axis of the “Niglo-Saxon order” and to appreciate Iran’s three-decade principled positions in the Caucasus. Tehran has the longest and most unique borders with the Caucasus. Even if the future document between Yerevan and Washington emphasizes the competence and sovereignty of the Armenian government, for several reasons, including the hegemonic approach, the violation of numerous legal obligations of the US government, the very negative performance history of American companies, and the inability of Armenia as a small country in front of the White House, there is no guarantee that Iran’s access to Armenia will not be disrupted and that this process will not lead to geopolitical changes; therefore, Tehran is opposed to Trump’s path, and the Yerevan government is expected to correct this approach during Dr. Pezhakian’s visit to Armenia.
  4. Those circles that emphasize the benefits of opening this route for Iran from Julfa do not mention the fact that Baku and Ankara are trying to make Iran’s rail connection with Turkey dependent on the Nakhchivan route and Baku’s will. In addition to welcoming the normal opening of the railway lines and emphasizing the importance of the Aras road and rail corridor; the best route for Iran’s rail and road connection to Armenia, Turkey and Nakhchivan is through the construction of the Marand to Cheshme Soraya railway (from there to Kars in Turkey, Ararat in Armenia and Sadrak in Nakhchivan) and the creation of the “Qarasu corridor” in the continuation of the Tabriz-Bazargan highway as part of the North-South corridor. This corridor reduces the distance from the Iranian border point to Yerevan from Nurduz from 400 km to about 50 km at the Qarasu border point.

Fifth, Article 15 of the Agreement on the withdrawal of any complaints and objections from legal authorities, as well as Article 2 of the Declaration on the joint action of Baku-Yerevan to demand the termination of the activities of the Minsk Group (the group established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to resolve the Karabakh conflict in 1992), are major concessions that Pashinyan has given to Aliyev. This will cause serious future challenges in the Armenian society and diaspora and the parliamentary elections on June 6, 2026 in Armenia. Because, this action means the Yerevan government’s renunciation of the ethnic cleansing of more than 120 thousand indigenous Armenians of Karabakh/Artsakh during the Third Karabakh War (2023), the release of the imprisoned Karabakh leaders in the courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and is a sign of Pashinyan’s movement within the framework of the Anglo-Saxon order. Armenia’s complaint against the Republic of Azerbaijan has been open since September 16, 2021, at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; a complaint is also open at the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is responsible for investigating international crimes including genocide; given the material and moral elements of Baku’s actions in September 2023 in Karabakh/Artsakh, and the positions of many prominent jurists, and the Court’s interim orders in this regard, it is clear that these cases, if continued, will lead to a heavy condemnation of Baku and an obligation for Baku to provide for the “safe return of Armenians to Karabakh” and respect for “their property, cultural and religious rights” and the reopening of the “Lachin Corridor”. However, the withdrawal of these complaints means that the Yerevan government has given Baku a green light to complete ethnic cleansing in Karabakh through cultural genocide, that is, the destruction, damage or alteration of Armenian religious and cultural monuments, which UNESCO and the European Parliament have expressed concern about.

Sixth, Article 3 of the agreement emphasizes that the parties will not allow any third party to use their territories to use force against the other party in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The legal fulfillment of this article of the agreement requires the termination of the Shushi Declaration. The Shushi Declaration was signed on June 15, 2021, by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in the city of Shushi. In this statement, while making accusations against Armenia, emphasizing the need to open the alleged Zangezur corridor, and threatening to demonstrate Armenia’s positions against regional peace and stability, it is emphasized: The parties will provide each other with the necessary assistance in the event of a threat or attack on the independence or territorial integrity of either of them by a third country.

Seventh, Article 8 of the Agreement emphasizes that “the Parties condemn and combat intolerance, racial hatred and discrimination, separatism, violent extremism and terrorism in all their manifestations, within their jurisdiction.” According to Article 12 of the Agreement, “the Parties shall be subject to international rules and this Agreement in their bilateral relations. Neither Party may invoke the provisions of its domestic laws as a justification for not implementing this Agreement.” The implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement requires the Republic of Azerbaijan to revise the content of educational, textbook and university history textbooks. These textbooks promote systematic hatred and territorial claims against Armenia and Iran. Also, in order to fulfill this article and Article 2 of the agreement (the commitment of the parties to refrain from any support or action aimed at dismembering or damaging the territorial integrity of the other country in whole or in part), the Republic of Azerbaijan must expel the Takfiri forces that it has deployed around Karabakh and the southern regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan since the Second Karabakh War, and stop granting Azerbaijani citizenship to these terrorists. Also, according to Article 12 of the agreement, Pashinyan is not obligated to change the Constitution of Armenia. After this, Baku does not have the right to request changes to the Constitution of Armenia; because, according to this article, the internal laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia will not affect the relations between the two countries. Therefore, requesting amendments to internal laws will violate Article 4 of the agreement, which prohibits the parties from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

Eighth, according to Article 7 of the agreement, the parties should not deploy any third-country forces along their common border. This article is a continuation of the alignment of Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan for the expulsion of Russian troops from the Caucasus. In the most important phase of this Anglo-Saxon approach, in 2023, following the ethnic cleansing of Karabakh from indigenous Armenians, Russian peacekeepers, who could have been present in Karabakh for five-year renewable periods under the 2020 Moscow ceasefire agreement, were forced to withdraw. Now, the fulfillment of this article means ensuring that Russian forces will not return to Armenia’s borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan. In 2024, at Armenia’s request, Russian forces withdrew from Armenia’s borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan, including in the Tavush province in the northeast of the country, which is the closest point in Armenia to the Baku oil pipelines. In the future, this development will also be repeated regarding the presence of Russian forces on Armenia’s border with Turkey. Finally, as Yerevan continues to suspend cooperation with the Collective Security Treaty, Russia’s military presence in Armenia will be limited to two bases in Erbuni and Gyumri, so that the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia can take a further step towards cooperation with NATO, as indicated by Trump’s Route.

Ninth, according to Article 11 of the Agreement, this Agreement does not violate the rights and obligations of the Parties under international law and treaties concluded by each of them with other Member States of the United Nations. From this perspective, and from a legal perspective, this Agreement should not interfere with the March 2022 Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the “Aras Corridor”, which is a regional transit project. The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding, signed between Shahin Mustafayev, Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, and Rustam Ghasemi, Minister of Transport of Iran, is to establish “rail and road connections” as well as new communication and energy lines between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of Iran. This project includes the construction of four bridges over the Aras River, the construction of two highways (with pedestrian crossings), two railway lines, communication and energy infrastructure. This 34-year-old route, parts of which from Aqband Zangilan (further along the newly constructed highway of the Republic of Azerbaijan) to Nakhchivan are being reconstructed and expanded by Iran within the framework of the 1400 Memorandum, but Baku’s behavior in this regard has so far been a political and propaganda exploitation of it against Armenia. For this reason, Baku’s influence network inside Iran in the last 5 years has focused its maximum attention on normalizing the fake Zangzur corridor and marginalizing the Aras Corridor project.

Tenth, according to Article 14 of the Agreement, in the event of a dispute in the implementation or interpretation of this Agreement, the solution will be direct consultations, including in the form of the commission referred to in Article 13, within 6 months, and ultimately the pursuit of other peaceful solutions. From this perspective, the aforementioned Agreement does not have an effective enforcement guarantee and is fragile. This is because, due to Baku’s opposition, this Article does not provide for referral to the International Court of Justice in the event of a dispute; while the Court’s rulings are one of the most effective legal guarantees for the implementation of important agreements.

*Dr. Ahmad Kazemi, Professor of International Law at the University and Senior Researcher on Eurasian Issues