With the aggressive war of the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran and the country’s intelligent use of its unleashed geopolitical capacities in the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with international law, new variables have been created to enhance deterrence against the aggressors; and the linkage of Iran’s security with the world’s energy, economic, and financial security has been revealed.

It can be said that the Strait of Hormuz, along with Yemen’s sovereignty over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, is only one of the geopolitical blessings of Iran and the Axis of Resistance, and there remain new, unactivated geopolitical codes that can become actualized in the assumed future. One of these is the South Caucasus region – the same historical, civilizational, and cultural home of Iranians, known to our compatriots through the mystical, literary, and religious myths of the Qaf Mountains, as well as the historical regret over the separation of this land, marked by the sacrifice of two hundred thousand martyrs and wounded in the wars between Iran and Tsarist Russia.

If we consider the macro-geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic characteristics of the Strait of Hormuz as the reason for its strategic importance for Iran and its role in creating deterrence in peacetime and punishing the enemy in wartime, it can be said that in a comparative approach, the South Caucasus – which has unique, long maritime and land borders with Iran – enjoys the same advantages as the Strait of Hormuz. This can be assessed through three similar components between the Strait of Hormuz and the South Caucasus:

First: The first component of the Strait of Hormuz’s importance is its role in supplying energy, especially oil and gas, to many countries in Asia and Europe, such that along with other strategic commodities, about 25% of the world’s oil and more than 20% of the world’s natural gas used to pass through this strait under the shadow of Iran’s sustainable security. Currently, through South Caucasus pipelines, especially TAP and TANAP, more than 13 billion cubic meters of gas are exported annually to 16 European countries, with prospects increasing exponentially as energy transfers from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan grow. For this reason, in 2022, the European Union signed a Strategic Energy Partnership Memorandum with the Republic of Azerbaijan to increase annual gas exports to more than 20 billion cubic meters. To this, one must also add the oil transit pipelines from the Caucasus.

Second: The second component of the Strait of Hormuz’s importance and sensitivity for Iran as the transit highway for energy is the deployment of various energy, industrial, commercial, financial, and cyber infrastructures in the Persian Gulf countries by the US, the UK, and Europe, alongside military bases – vulnerabilities that became evident during the Third Imposed War. The oil-rich Republic of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, with investments made over the past three decades, hosts hundreds of infrastructures belonging to the US, the Israeli regime, and the UK. The region’s energy infrastructures, including those in the Caspian Sea and transit pipelines, are mainly monopolized by BP of the UK, Chevron and ExxonMobil of the US, and the Israeli regime. Alongside commercial, IT, and military infrastructures such as drone assembly plants, they are worth tens of billions of dollars. In fact, after the Persian Gulf and the shores of the Strait of Hormuz, the Caucasus is the closest hub of US and allied investment to Iran, and its scope is increasing via the Trump route, which itself indicates a lack of understanding by regional statesmen of the consequences of the post-war order.

Third: Like the Strait of Hormuz, the transit role of the Caucasus is not limited to energy transfer. The Caucasus, especially during the two-year genocide in Gaza and thereafter, in the form of the Northern Corridor – from “Kazakhstan connected to the Abraham Accords,” the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey – serves as a transit axis for supplies, materials, and logistical goods to Israel.

On this basis, the Caucasus can be called “Iran’s second Strait of Hormuz”; especially if the goal is to pressure the US and the Israeli regime, the Caucasus has certain advantages in some respects. This is because the Republic of Azerbaijan, an ally of the Israeli regime that somewhat plays the role of the UAE in the Persian Gulf within the Caucasus, supplies more than 60% of that regime’s oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, while also hosting its unofficial bases. Energy facilities in the Republic of Azerbaijan are currently the only “fixed cross-border facilities” supplying oil and fuel needed by the Israeli regime. Hence, the Caucasus card can be considered among Iran’s future geopolitical cards in case war resumes and the axis of aggression does not accept Iran’s terms.

Dr. Ahmad Kazemi; Professor of International Law at the University and Senior Eurasia Research Fellow